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LAWN SIGN LITIGATION: WHAT MAKES A
STATUTE CONTENT-BASED FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT PURPOSES?
I. INTRODUCTION
Although based on a seemingly simple concept, free speech has
produced a complex and constantly changing set of tests and rules.1 The
First Amendment gives the government a broad and vague mandate to not
restrict free speech, but does not account for speech that the government

must regulate. 2 Local governments have an important interest in
maintaining the safety and aesthetics of outdoor areas, including the
appearance of signs in publicly visible places.3
Individuals and
organizations have the constitutional right to express themselves, including
placing signs in the public view.4 In order to balance these interests, the
Supreme Court has held that the government "has no power to restrict
expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or6 its
content.",5 The shorthand for these types of statutes is "content-based.,

The First Amendment holds a place of particular prominence in the

See John D. Moore, The Closed and Shrinking Frontier of Unprotected Speech, 36
WHITTIER L. REv. 1, 4 (2014) (stating that "[t]he Supreme Court's free speech jurisprudence is
notoriously complex and contradictory."). Moore also notes the language other scholars have
used to describe the doctrine, including a "bizarre mess" and a "complex array of rules, which
some consider more suitable for a tax code than a statement of constitutional principle." ld.
2 See Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content Approach to
Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1347, 1357-59 (2006)
(criticizing modern interpretation of First Amendment); Erwin Chemerinsky, The First
Amendment: When the Government Must Make Content-Based Choices, 42 CLEV. ST. L. REV.
199, 204-07 (1994) (analyzing situations where government is inevitably forced to regulate
speech based on content).
3 See Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984)
(finding that safety and aesthetics are important government goals); see also Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1981) (reaffirming that safety and aesthetics are
substantial government goals).
4 See Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 501 (describing outdoor signs as important medium of
expression); Jason R. Burt, Speech Interests Inherent in the Location of Billboards and Signs: A
Method for Unweaving the Tangled Web of Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 2006 B.Y.U.
L. REV. 473, 492-93 (2006) (detailing importance of outdoor signs).
5 Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).
6 See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 201-02 (summarizing history of content-based
categorization in Supreme Court case law).

320

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXI

home, which is a specially recognized area for speech. Common forms of
speech within the purview of the home are political lawn signs.8 Local
governments have a significant interest in regulating these lawn signs for
the purpose of safety and aesthetics in the community. 9 However, these
ordinances must not unduly regulate content in order to remain
constitutionally valid. 0 The Supreme Court categorizes statutesas either
content-based or content-neutral. 1 The question of how this distinction is
made is a contested matter. 12
Until June of 2015, a split existed among the circuits about what

7 See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 59 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (noting
discrimination against content of speech by private citizens on private property is "presumptively
impermissible").
8 See WSU PODCAST: Why Political Yard Signs Matter, WICHITA ST.U., Oct. 13, 2008,
http://www.wichita.edu/thisis/stories/story.asp?si-423 ("Political yard signs provide name
recognition and more, according to Kahn."). Lawn signs are a staple of American political
campaigns, providing name recognition for the candidate and an estimated 6-10 votes per sign.
Id. It is uncommon for campaigns to go without them, and even nonpartisan messages have been
shown to increase voter turnout. See Sean Quinn, BREAKING: Obama Campaign Organizers
Trying to Win Election Instead of Get You Yard Sign, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT, Sept. 21, 2008,
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/breaking-obama-campaign-organizers/
(opining that outrage
surrounding Obama's decision to forgo lawn signs in certain areas was misplaced); How
Powerful Is a Political Yard Sign?, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO, Mar. 10, 2012,
http://www.npr.org/2012/03/10/14835 1027/how-powerful-is-a-political-yard- sign
(discussing
study from Fordham University about effectiveness of nonpartisan yard signs).
9 See Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 507-08("... traffic safety and the appearance of the city
-- are substantial governmental goals.").
10 See, e.g., Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) ("Regulation of the subject matter of
messages, though not as obnoxious as viewpoint-based regulation, is also an objectionable form
of content-based regulation."); Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 641-43 (1994)
(For these reasons, the First Amendment, subject only to narrow and well-understood exceptions,
does not countenance governmental control over the content of messages expressed by private
individuals."); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (limiting depth to which government may look at content
in order to regulate speech).
" See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)
(establishing when government may impose content-based regulations); United States v. Grace,
461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (dictating when government may impose content-neutral regulations).
12 Compare Neighborhood Enters. Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 644 F.3d 728, 731 (8th Cir. 2011)
(concluding zoning code failed strict scrutiny), Service Emps. Int'l Union, Local 5 v. City of
Houston, 595 F.3d 588, 605 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding ordinance was unconstitutionally vague),
and Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2005) (finding barest
examination of content unconstitutional), with Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d 294, 297 (4th
Cir. 2013) (permitting residential signs to be subject to reasonable restrictions), American Civil
Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding eavesdropping
statute restricted speech more than necessary), Melrose, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380,
383 (3d Cir. 2010) (allowing "content sensitive" analysis), H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of
Detroit, 568 F.3d 609, 612 (6th Cir. 2009) (deciding constitutionality of ordinances on subject
matter basis), and G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1085 (9th Cir. 2006)
(allowing distinctions to be made based on subject matter).
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rule to apply when determining whether an ordinance was content-based.13
The "absolutist" circuits took a strict view, holding that any statute which
on its face looked to content was impermissible under the First
Amendment. 14 The "practical" circuits took a more relaxed approach,
holding that differentiations based on content were not barred so long as
one type of content was not treated less favorably than another. 15 In the
case of Reed v. Town of Gilbert,16 the Supreme Court definitively sided
with the absolutist circuits in a unanimous decision.1 7 Specifically, the
Court held that any look at the communicative content of a sign was
impermissible and would automatically trigger strict scrutiny.18
Given that the absolutist view was the minority among the circuits,
disputes over sign codes in several circuits are now ripe for appellate
review. 9 Due to the automatic strict scrutiny trigger, any town faced with
this type of appeal will more than likely lose. 20 Additionally, the holding
could have wider implications for the interpretation of the First
Amendment in other speech contexts, following the current trend of the
Roberts Court limiting the power of the government in this area.2 1
This note seeks to provide guidance to practitioners who are
bringing or appealing similar causes of action under the different theories
by highlighting strategies that have prevailed and warning against those

13 See Wagner v. City of Garfield Heights, 577 F. App'x 488, 494-95 (6th Cir. 2014)

(discussing circuit split on content-based ordinances), vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015).
14 See, e.g., Neighborhood Enters. Inc., 644 F.3d at 728 (concluding zoning code failed strict
scrutiny); Service Emps. Int'l Union, Local 5, 595 F.3d at 588 (holding ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague); Solantic, LLC, 410 F.3d at 1250 (finding barest examination of content
unconstitutional).
15 See, e.g. Brown, 706 F.3d at 294 (permitting residential signs to be subject to reasonable
restrictions); Alvarez, 679 F.3d at 583 (holding eavesdropping statute restricted speech more than
necessary); Melrose, Inc., 613 F.3d at 380-83 (holding zoning ordinance limiting advertisements
to identification signs with advertising aspects in certain areas content-neutral); H.D.V.-

Greektown, LLC, 568 F.3d at 609 (deciding constitutionality of ordinances on subject matter
basis); G.K. Ltd. Travel, 436 F.3d at 1064 (allowing distinctions to be made based on subject
matter).
16 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
17 See id. at 2232 (naming specifically their approach as "absolutist").
18 See id. at 2227 (stating if ordinance is content-based on its face, strict scrutiny applies).
19 See generally Thayer v. City of Worcester, 135 S. Ct. 2887 (2015) (mem.); Cent. Radio
Co. v. City of Norfolk, 135 S. Ct. 2893 (2015) (mem.); Wagner v. City of Garfield Heights, 135
S. Ct. 2888 (2015) (mem.) (vacating and remanding cases for review in light of Reed). These
cases arose in the First, Fourth, and Sixth Circuits, respectively.
20 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2236-37 (Kagan, J., concurring) (detailing consequences of using
automatic strict scrutiny trigger).
21 See Moore, supra note 1, at 17-38 (analyzing recent line of precedent narrowing area of
unprotected speech).
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that the courts have found unpersuasive. 22 It will detail the history of First
Amendment litigation and show the development of current content
discrimination frameworks. 23 Next, it will discuss the current landscape of
content discrimination.2 4 Finally, it will provide practitioners with a map
of what legal theories will prevail in these cases. 25
II. HISTORY
The First Amendment guarantees the right of free speech and that
the expression of the people will not be abridged by Congress. 26 States are
further prohibited from abridging free speech and expression via the
27
Fourteenth Amendment.
Permissible restrictions on speech are
determined by looking at content neutrality, meaning that a court
determines whether a statute looks at the substance of speech to regulate
it.28 This process is described in a complicated and often contradictory line
of precedent, tied into what the Supreme Court2 9of the time has determined
to be the core purpose of the First Amendment

A. The Purpose of the First Amendment
In the past 40 years, there has been a shift in the Supreme Court's
view of the purpose of the First Amendment.3 0 Before 1972, there was a
focus on whether the government had infringed upon the rights of the

See
See
24 See
25 See
26 See

infra Part IV.
infra Part II.
infra Part III (discussing facts about current discrimination).
infra Part IV.
U.S. CONST. amend. I. ("Congress shall make no law . ..abridging the freedom of
speech ...").
27 See Grosjeanv. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244 (1936) ("[F]reedom of speech and of the
22
23

press are rights of the same fundamental character, safeguarded by the due process of law clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgement by state legislation ....");Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) ("For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of
speech and of the press -- which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by
Congress -- are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the due
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States."); see also U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (preventing State from depriving citizens of equal protection of laws).
28 See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom
of Speech:
Problems in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 49, 51-56 (2000) (describing
history of content neutrality analysis).
29 See id.
(commenting on purpose of First Amendment and outlining case law).
30 See Kenneth Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the First Amendment, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 20, 21-22 (1975) (discussing paradigm shift in Supreme Court interpretation of First
Amendment).
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people.3 1 However, the modern trend has been a focus on equality and
ensuring that all speech is treated the same.3 2 Thus, content neutrality has
become the cornerstone of First Amendment analysis.33
First Amendment issues-and by proxy content neutralityimplicate a fundamental right that receives strict scrutiny.34 The Supreme
35
Court has articulated two different purposes for applying strict scrutiny.1
First, applying strict scrutiny intends "to preserve an uninhibited
marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail., 3 6 Second,
strict scrutiny prevents the government from regulating speech "based
on
3
7
expressed.,
message
underlying
the
hostility-or favoritism-towards
B. The First Amendment Framework and Content Analysis
The State is expressly prohibited from "completely suppress[ing]
the dissemination of truthful information about an entirely lawful activity
merely because it is fearful of that information's effect upon its
disseminators and its recipients." 38 The Supreme Court has examined the
issue of how to regulate signs by determining whether a statute analyzes
the content of a sign.3 9 Content analysis for First Amendment purposes
begins by determining whether a statute is content-based or content-neutral
in order to determine the properly level of scrutiny it should receive. 0
Content-based restrictions look at the subject matter of the sign and

31 See
32 See
33 See
34 See

id. at 26-27 (describing shift away from liberty principles).
id.at 26-27, 29-35 (recounting rise of equality principles).
Chemerinsky, supra note 28, at 51-56 (tracking case law utilizing content neutrality).
Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 312 n.3 (1976)

(enumerating cases where strict scrutiny applied to implication of fundamental rights).
35 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2237 (2015) (Kagan, J., concurring)
(discussing precedent related to content analysis).
36 McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S.Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (quoting F.C.C. v. League of Women
Voters of Ca., 468 U.S. 364, 377 (1984)) (relying on the purpose of the First Amendment).
37 R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
38 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 505 (1981) (citing Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 770-73).
39 See, e.g., City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 53 (1994) (noting discrimination against
content of speech by private citizens on private property is "presumptively impermissible");
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805-06 (1984); Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 490 (finding
that safety and aesthetics are important government goals); Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township
of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 98 (1977) (addressing question of restricting signs); see also Burt,
supra note 4, at 492-505 (summarizing relevant Supreme Court cases).
40 See Police Dep't of Chicago. v.Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99-100 (1972) (striking down statute
that prevented non-labor related picketing for being content-based); see also Burt, supra note 4, at
478 (indicating Mosley held that content analysis is first step).
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41
discriminate based on it.
Put another way, content-based statutes are ones
that "distinguish[] favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of
the ideas or views expressed., 42 These types of restrictions violate the
constitutional fundamental right to free speech and are presumptively
invalid.43 These regulations receive strict scrutiny, meaning they must
serve a compelling government interest by narrowly tailored means.44
Content-neutral restrictions manage only the time, place, and
manner of a sign, thereby never reaching the issue of actual content.45
These regulations receive intermediate scrutiny, meaning they must serve
an important government interest by rationally related means.4 6 The
important government interest must not be related to the speech contained
in the sign.
An example of a qualifying interest under this formula is
aesthetics and public safety. 48 Content-neutral regulations must allow
ample room for alternative means of communication should speech be in
some way restricted.49
For better or for worse, content neutrality has become the

41

See R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech: The

Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REv. 333, 337 (2006) ("[W]hether a statute
is content neutral or content based is something that can be determined on the face of it; if the
statute describes speech by content then it is content based.").
42 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 643 (1989).
43 See R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992) ("Content-based regulations
are
presumptively invalid.").
44 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981) (citing Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455, 461, 464-65 (1980)) (affirming content-based restrictions should receive strict scrutiny); see
also Wright, supra note 41, at 363-64 (reviewing history of strict scrutiny in relation to contentbased regulations).
45 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (allowing restrictions that only
regulate times, places, and manners of speech in public forums).
46 See id. (describing narrowly tailored requirement).
47 See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 723 (2000) (rejecting restrictions made because of
subject matter expressed); Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 641-43 (stating that subject matter and
viewpoint are impermissible criteria for discrimination); Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95 (overturning
statute based on viewpoint expressed alone).
48 See Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805 (1984)
(finding that safety and aesthetics are important government goals); Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at
507-08 (reaffirming safety and aesthetics are substantial government goals). It should be noted
that "[c]ourts refer to the kinds of interests that intermediate scrutiny sanctions as 'important,'
'significant,' 'substantial,' and 'legitimate."' Wagner v. City of Garfield Heights, 577 F. App'x
488, 498 n.9 (6th Cir. 2014). However, "compelling" is a legal term of art used only to refer to
strict scrutiny. Id.
49 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50 (1986) (enunciating rule
that alternative channels must remain open); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976) (holding restrictions justified in part if "they ...
leave open ample alternative channels for communication").
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cornerstone of free speech analysis.50 It has been criticized as lacking
nuance, since some government choices involving content are simply
unavoidable. 5 ' Different types of speech can also be difficult to define,
S 52 and
subcategorizing what qualifies as content raises even more questions>
Despite the difficulties defining different kinds of speech, there are
six different elements of speech that the Supreme Court has taken into
account when analyzing speech discrimination.
First, discrimination
based on viewpoint or subject matter is prohibited.54 This occurs when
speech is prohibited merely because of what the speech is about, and the
Supreme •••Court
has consistently applied strict scrutiny to this
55
classification.
Second, there are concerns regarding the components of
the underlying speech, such as the "speaker's choice of words, symbols,
and images., 56 However, these do not enjoy the automatic strict scrutiny
that viewpoint discrimination
S 57 does, and format may maybe subject to a less
stringent level of scrutiny.
Third, the Supreme Court has considered the
effect of speech on the listener. 5 The Supreme Court generally considers
laws that regulate based on the effect on the audience content-based and
impermissible.5 9 Fourth, the speech's purpose or mode may be subject to

50 See Chemerinsky, supra note 28, at 49 (calling content neutrality increasingly "the central
inquiry" in free speech cases).
51 See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 205 (pointing out impossibility of total government
neutrality); see also McDonald, supra note 2, at 1355-60 (criticizing overly broad holding of
Mosley as root of problems in current jurisprudence).
52 See John Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1103, 1122 (2005) (summarizing
difficulties of legally defining "content-based regulation"). Fee poses two questions at the center
of First Amendment analysis: "First, what aspects of speech are included within the meaning of
Icontent'?
Second, in what manner (motive or effect) is the government forbidden to
discriminate?" Id.
53 See id. at 1123-30 (discussing six elements of speech).
54 See id. at 1123 (rejecting viewpoint and subject matter as legitimate grounds for excluding
speech); see also Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) ("If there is a bedrock principle
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of an
idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable"); Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) ("'The principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality . . . whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because of
disagreement with the message it conveys."').
55 See Fee, supra note 52, at 1123 (establishing this form of discrimination as consistently
unconstitutional).
56 See id. at 1124 ("Consequently, the government engages in content-based discrimination
when it undertakes to punish the use of profanity, to prohibit nudity at outdoor movie theatres, or
to restrict sexual content on the internet.").
57 See id.at 1124-25 (explaining that components of speech receive lower standard of
review). Fee also notes that because of this somewhat lax approach to these parts of speech,
questions have arisen concerning the breadth of its application. Id.at 1125.
58 See id. at 1125 (recounting Court's reaction to ordinances based on listener's reaction).
59 See id. at 1125-26 (noting these laws as generally invalid); see also Hustler Magazine, Inc.
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regulation. 60 This is distinguished from the previous category by focusing
on "simply establish[ing] a minor place restriction on an extremely broad
category of communications with unwilling listeners., 61
Fifth, laws
concerning the source of the information have been found to be contentneutral. 62 Sixth and finally, the Court has considered laws that discriminate
based on the speaker. 6 ' This component has seen mixed results from the
Court, which sometimes defers to the individual or corporation and others
times to the government actor. 64

C. The Pathway to the Current Content Discrimination Framework
i. The Effect of Metromedia, Inc.
Much of the confusion around content neutrality appears to stem
from disparate interpretations of the Supreme Court decision in
Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego.65 The controversy was whether a
San Diego ordinance that functionally banned billboards as a method of
advertising was constitutional. 66 Although most outdoor displays were
prohibited, the statute provided exceptions for twelve articulated categories
67
and onsite signs. The City argued that the ordinance had been enacted to

v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 57 (1988) (holding offensive speech was not subject to tort action for
intentional infliction of emotional distress).
60 See Fee, supra note 52, at 1127-28 (finding acceptable classification based on purpose of
speech); see also Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000) ("[U]nlawful within the regulated
areas for any person to 'knowingly approach' within eight feet of another person, without that
person's consent, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or
engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling with such other person.").
61 See Hill, 530 U.S. at 723 (distinguishing speech purpose discrimination from effect on
listener discrimination).
62 See Fee, supra note 52, at 1128 (recounting Court's holding that intercepting information
does not discriminate based on viewpoint).
63 See id.at 1129 (discussing Supreme Court's treatment of laws that regulate based on
speaker).
64 Compare Rosenberger v. Rector of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 828 (1995) ("In the realm
of private speech or expression, government regulation may not favor one speaker over
another."), with Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. F.C.C., 512 U.S. 622, 657-59 (1994) ("[S]peakerbased laws demand strict scrutiny when they reflect the Government's preference for the
substance of what the favored speakers have to say .... ). Such conflicting results preclude a
consistent application of a speaker based discrimination approach. See Fee, supra note 52, at
1130 (indicating lack of consistency in Court's application).
65 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
66 See id.at 493-96 (outlining controversy).
67 Id. at 494. Onsite signs included those for identification of the place and to advertise only
goods that were made on location or services rendered therein, ld. The twelve excepted
categories were as follows:
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eliminate hazards from distracting signs and to advance city aesthetics.6 8
The appellants, companies that owned billboards, contended that it was a
violation of their First Amendment rights and would force them out of
business.
The Court struck down the ordinance .
However, the case
generated a plurality opinion, a concurring opinion, as well as three
separate dissenting opinions. 1
The plurality first analyzed the distinction made by the statute
between commercial and noncommercial speech .2 Noting that commercial
speech was in general less rigorously protected under the First Amendment
than noncommercial speech, the Court held that the part of the San Diego
statute pertaining to commercial speech was permissible. v
The plurality focused on the exceptions to the ordinance and
delved deeper into the analysis of how noncommercial speech was handled
under the statute.
It divided up noncommercial speech into different
types, some prohibited and others not. Considering the direct connection
between the actual content of the speech and what the statute prevents, it
was content-based and unconstitutional . 76 The Court noted that it was more

[G]overnment signs; signs located at public bus stops; signs manufactured,
transported, or stored within the city, if not used for advertising purposes;
commemorative historical plaques; religious symbols; signs within shopping malls;
for sale and for lease signs; signs on public and commercial vehicles; signs
depicting time, temperature, and news; approved
temporary,
off-premises,
subdivision directional signs; and "[temporary] political campaign signs."
Id.at 494-95.
68 See id.at 493-94 (providing exceptions to ordinance by statute).
69 See id.at 496-97 (discussing parties and procedural history).
70 See Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 521 (finding ordinance unconstitutional on face).
71 ld. at 493, 521, 540, 555, 569. For a concise breakdown of the postures of all of these
opinions, see Burt, supra note 4, at 494-98 (summarizing relevant Supreme Court cases).
72 See Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 503-06 (explaining difference in standards for
commercial and noncommercial communications).
73 See id. at 504-05, 507 (disagreeing with appellant's contention that San Diego fails four
part test). In order to make this determination, the Court used the established four-part test from
Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm 'n. See id.at 507 (citing 447 U.S.
557 (1980)) (explaining four part test).
74 See id. at 514-15 (looking at exceptions in statute).
75 See id. The Court turned to the controlling cases around noncommercial speech, and
stated that it was impermissible to categorize noncommercial speech in the same way as
commercial speech. See id.("Although the city may distinguish between the relative value of
different categories of commercial speech, the city does not have the same range of choice in the
area of noncommercial speech to evaluate the strength of, or distinguish between, various
communicative interests." (citing Carey v.Brown, 447 U.S. 455,462 (1980))).
76 See id. at 514-15 (averring statute's unconstitutionality where types of speech were treated
differently). Invoking language from previous case law, the Court reasons "[t]oallow a
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than a regulation of time, place, and manner, so the city had overreached
the permissible bounds of its legitimate interest in safety and aesthetics.
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Brennan applied the content
neutrality framework to the issue.7' Rejecting the analysis of commercial
and noncommercial speech as a starting point, Brennan's analysis never
reached the issue of the exceptions. Instead, he argued that the city failed
to show that their interest was sufficiently substantial to make an overall
ban on certain kinds of speech legitimate.80 As an alternative to this
analysis, he proposed what he believed was a more appropriate contentneutral analysis.81

D. Tiered Protection: Non-commercial Speech, Commercial Speech,
and Low Value Speech
While the First Amendment places a broad protection on speech as
a general concept, certain types of speech are valued above others.12 Non-

government the choice of permissible subjects for public debate would be to allow that
government control over the search for political truth." ILd. (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. of
N.Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 538 (1980)).
77 See Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 515-16. The Court noted that the ordinance failed on
two counts: first, "[s]igns that are banned are banned everywhere and at all times[;]" and second,
there were no alternative channels available because both parties had stated there were not. Id.
78 See id. at 526-27 ("I would apply the tests this Court has developed to analyze contentneutral prohibitions of particular media of communication.").
79 See id. at 522 (asserting that this case presented total ban issue).
so ld. at 528. Justice Brennan analogized the case to Schad v. Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61,
73 (1981):
This Court noted in Schad that "[the] [city] has presented no evidence, and it is not
immediately apparent as a matter of experience, that live entertainment poses
problems ... more significant than those associated with various permitted uses; nor
does it appear that the [city] has arrived at a defensible conclusion that unusual
problems are presented by live entertainment." Substitute the word "billboards" for
the words "live entertainment," and that sentence would equally apply to this case.
ld. at 530 (quoting Schad, 452 U.S. at 73).
81 See Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 526-27 (Brennan, J., concurring) (rejecting majority's
reliance on exceptions to ban to invalidate ordinance). Brennan's proposed analysis relied on a
series of previous Supreme Court cases concerning total bans on certain media, consistently
finding that less-restrictive means of regulation were available to avoid infringement upon a First
Amendment right, ld. at 527; see Schad, 452 U.S. at 70 (stating less intrusive means available
than ban to serve government interest of regulating live entertainment); Martin v. City of
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 149 (1943) (rejecting municipal ordinance banning door-to-door
solicitation); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (invalidating ban on distributing
handbills).
82 See Moore, supra note 1, at 18 (stating some speech is so low "as to be unworthy of First
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commercial speech is the least regulated given that it typically involves
private speech and expression. 3 Commercial speech is afforded slightly
less protection, given that it is less important to the values of the First
Amendment. 4 Finally, low value speech is not protected by the First
5
Amendment, and it is categorically defined by certain types of speech.
Non-commercial speech is the realm traditionally protected by the
First Amendment. 6 It is an expansive category, and protects most private
speech.81 Regulations on this type of speech are strictly prohibited from
looking to content.8 8
Content based regulations are subject to strict
9
scrutiny.
If a regulation is found to be content neutral, it is subject to
intermediate scrutiny. 90
Commercial speech is relatively new to First Amendment
protection. 91 Until 1976, protecting commercial speech was not considered92
integral to upholding the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech.
However, commercial speech is now a lesser protected class of speech, and
the Supreme Court distinguishes between it and noncommercial speech. 93
To determine whether commercial speech is permissible, the Court created
a four-part test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service

Amendment protection.").
83 See Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 514-15 (distinguishing commercial speech from
noncommercial speech, and valuing noncommercial speech more highly).
84 See id. at 506 (citing Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978))
(indicating commercial speech is less essential to core purpose of First Amendment).
85 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (categorizing unprotected
speech as that which do not aid "any exposition of ideas").
86 See Metromedia, Inc., 453 U.S. at 513 ("[Our recent commercial speech cases have
consistently accorded noncommercial speech a greater degree of protection than commercial
speech.").
87 See Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment: A Preliminary
Exploration of ConstitutionalSalience, 117 HARv. L. REV. 1765, 1769 (2004) (stating that most

speech is protected).
88 See Fee, supra note 52, at 1123-30 (detailing aspects of speech that cannot be
discriminated against).
89 See sources cited supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text (describing content-based
restrictions and appropriate level of scrutiny).
90 See sources cited supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (giving information about
content-neutral restrictions and appropriate level of scrutiny).
91 See Burt, supra note 4, at 485-87 (reviewing history of commercial speech in context of
First Amendment).
92 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 452 U.S. 490, 505 (1981) (telling history of
unprotected commercial speech); see also Burt, supra note 4, at 486-87 (describing historical
precedent of unprotected commercial speech).
93 See Virginia State Bd. of Phar. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 77073 (1976) (holding commercial speech protected under First Amendment).
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Commission.94 The test requires that: (1) the commercial speech must
concern a lawful activity and must not be misleading; (2) the restriction
promotes a substantial government interest; (3) the restriction advances that
substantial interest; and (4) the restriction is narrowly tailored to achieve
that interest. 95 This test differs from protection of non-commercial speech
by not quite reaching strict scrutiny and requiring an initial examination of
the content of speech to determine its lawfulness.9 6
Low value speech is not protected by the First Amendment. 97 The
categories are specifically defined as "the lewd and obscene, the profane,
the libelous, and the insulting or 'fighting' words-those which by their
very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the
peace. '
The Supreme Court held in a recent decision that no new
categories of speech may be added. 99

E. The Roberts Court and the First Amendment
In the past five years, the Roberts Court has substantially shifted
the framework of First Amendment analysis.100 In three cases that focused

specifically on low value speech, the Court has limited the government's
power to regulate speech. 0 This narrowing of the government's power

94 447 U.S. 557, 563-66 (1980) (implementing new test in order to balance First Amendment
rights and state's interests).
95 See id. (describing test); Metromedia, 452 U.S. at 507 (expanding on CentralHudson test).
96 See Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 563-66 (including element of content based examination
in test).
97 See Chaplinksky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 570-72 (1942) (explaining low value
speech is not traditional area First Amendment sought to protect).
98 See id. at 571-72 (defining low value speech).
99 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (calling "free-floating test" for
First Amendment categories "startling and dangerous"); Toni M. Massaro, Tread on Me!, 17 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 365, 398-401 (2014) (discussing implications of adding no new exceptions for
low value speech).
1oo See Moore, supra note 1, at 18 (shifting to no balancing test implied by language of
protections).
101 See e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 2537, 2544 (2012) (giving protection to
low
value speech); Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2736-42 (2011) (holding video
games are a protected form of speech under the First Amendment); United States v. Stevens, 559
U.S. 460, 480 (2010) ("Thus, the protection of the First Amendment presumptively extends to
many forms of speech that do not qualify for the serious-value exception of § 48(b), but
nonetheless fall within the broad reach of § 48(c)"). In Stevens, the Supreme Court overturned a
Federal law that criminalized the "commercial creation, sale, or possession of animal cruelty."
See Moore, supra note 1, at 18 (citing Stevens, 559 U.S. at 460) (stating some speech is so low
"as to be unworthy of First Amendment protection."); see also 18 U.S.C. § 48 (noting statute used
in decision). The law was apparently in response to the rising interstate market for "crush
videos," or videos of small animals being slowly crushed to death, often by women in either
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1 2
signals a broader strengthening of First Amendment protections. 0
The Roberts Court has rejected the notion that categories of low
value speech may be easily expanded, holding that the government may not
decide when speech is valuable.10 3 Even the existing categories will not be
expanded from their traditional definitions. 1°4 In order for a category to be
added or expanded, the Roberts Court has implemented a "persuasive
evidence" test.10 5 While the derivative case law is focused on low value
speech, these holdings are indicative of broader framework of First
Amendment analysis that the Roberts Court implements. 10 6 Under this
theory of narrow government powers in restricting speech, the Roberts
Court resolved a split 10among the circuit courts concerning First
Amendment interpretation. 7

Il. FACTS
Before June of 2015, there was a split among the U.S. Circuit
Courts of Appeal about how to determine whether a sign statute was
content-based under the First Amendment. 0 8 Two competing theories
existed: the "absolutist" circuits and the "practical" circuits. 0 9

stilettos or bare feet. See Moore, supra note 1, at 18-19. In Brown, the Court overturned a
California law that prohibited the sale or rental of violent video games to minors. See id. at 24
(explaining video games are a protected form of speech under the First Amendment). In Alvarez,
the Court overturned a Federal law that criminalized lying about receiving military honors. See
id. at 29-30 (giving protection to low value speech). The case specifically dealt with a defendant
who had lied about receiving the Congressional Medal of Honor. ld. at 24.
102 See Massaro, supra note 99, at 369-70 (indicating that areas of protected speech are
expanding).
103 See sources cited supra notes 100-02 and accompanying text (recounting precedent on
low value speech).
104 See cases cited supra note 101 and accompanying text (giving Roberts Court's view of
low value speech exclusions).
105 See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 564 U.S. 786, 792 (2011) ("But without persuasive
evidence that a novel restriction on content is part of a long (if heretofore unrecognized) tradition
of proscription, a legislature may not revise the 'judgment [of] the American people,' embodied
in the First Amendment, 'that the benefits of its restrictions on the Government outweigh the
costs."' (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010))).
106 See sources cited supra notes 100-102 and accompanying text (indicating narrow
government powers in low value speech analysis).
107 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015) (holding sign code "impose[d]
more stringent restrictions" than permissible); see also infra Part III (describing circuit split and
eventual resolution).
108 See cases cited supra note 12 (comparing cases discussing subject matter based
distinctions).
109 See Wagner v. City of Garfield Heights, 577 F. App'x 488, 493-95 (6th Cir. 2014),
vacated, 135 S. Ct. 2888 (2015) (describing circuit split).
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A. The Split: A Tale of Two Theories
The Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh circuits were the absolutist
circuits. 11 In these circuits, any look at content, no matter how cursory,
failed the prima facie test for content neutrality.1
Laying out a list of

exceptions to an ordinance-such as allowing religious signs where other
signs are not-can be enough to make a statute content-based because it
references the subject matter of the speech.1 1 2 This was the minority view

among the split.113
Private individuals were more likely to be successful in these
circuits. 114 Because these courts were more likely to find a statute was
content-based, governments had a high burden to overcome with strict

scrutiny.

15

The1

16

sign

codes,

or

portions

thereof,

were

held

unconstitutional.'
The Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits were the
practical circuits. 117 The courts using this theory took a more relaxed view
110 See, e.g., Neighborhood Enters. Inc. v. City of St. Louis, 644 F.3d 728, 738-39 (8th Cir.
2011) (concluding zoning code failed strict scrutiny); Service Emps. Int'l Union, Local 5 v. City
of Houston, 595 F.3d 588, 595-05 (5th Cir. 2010) (holding ordinance was unconstitutionally
vague); Solantic, LLC v. City of Neptune Beach, 410 F.3d 1250, 1274 (11th Cir. 2005)
(highlighting absolutist analysis).
111See cases cited supra note 110 (outlining cases where any look to content failed the prima
facie test).
112 See Solantic, 410 F.3d at 1258 (holding that exemptions based on content are
discriminatory).
113 See cases cited supra note 12 (comparing two sides of circuit split). Three circuits
made
up the absolutist circuits while there were five that subscribed to practical analysis. See cases
cited supra note 12 (comparing two sides of circuit split).
114 See Neighborhood Enters. Inc., 644 F.3d at 736 (describing holding of the case); Service
Emps. Int'l Union, Local 5 v. City of Houston, 595 F.3d 588, 605 (5th Cir. 2010); Solantic, 410
F.3d at 1274 (holding for plaintiffs because of content-based code that failed strict scrutiny or
impermissible vagueness).
115 See Neighborhood Enters. Inc., 644 F.3d at 737-38 ("[E]ven when a government supplies
a content-neutral justification for the regulation, that justification is not given controlling weight
without further inquiry."' (quoting Whitton v. City of Gladstone, 54 F.3d 1400, 1408 (1995));
cases cited supra note 110 (applying strict scrutiny to content-based statutes).
116 See cases cited supra note 110 (giving cases where codes were found unconstitutional).
117 See, e.g., Brown v. Town of Cary, 706 F.3d 294, 297 (4th Cir. 2013) (holding town
ordinance content-neutral where regulation justified for reasons independent of content);
American Civil Liberties Union of Ill. v. Alvarez, 679 F.3d 583, 587 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding
eavesdropping statute content neutral); Melrose, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 613 F.3d 380, 383 (3d
Cir. 2010) (holding zoning ordinance limiting advertisements to identification signs with
advertising aspects in certain areas content-neutral); H.D.V.-Greektown, LLC v. City of Detroit,
568 F.3d 609, 612 (6th Cir. 2009) (holding city ordinance imposing different height requirements
on various types of advertisement signs content-neutral); G.K. Ltd. Travel v. City of Lake
Oswego, 436 F.3d 1064, 1076-78 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding city ordinance exempting certain
entities from permit process content-neutral, where provisions based on speaker).
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of what made a statute content-based.118 Types of signs could be regulated
differently so long as there was no type of content being treated less
favorably than another is.119 Since, in their view, exceptions did invalidate
a statute on its face, the analysis more often moved into whether an
ordinance regulated time, place, and manner and
whether there were
12
sufficient alternative channels for communication. 0
Governments had more success in practical circuits. 121 Sign codes
122
were more often upheld because they received intermediate scrutiny.
Government parties then would point to safety and aesthetics as the
important interests, which would meet their burden. 123 Private individuals
were often left without remedy.1 24
B. Reed and the Advancement of Absolutism
This split was resolved in the recent case of Reed v. Town 126
of
circuits.
absolutist
the
with
sided
Court
Supreme
the
which
in
Gilbert,
125

The case arose from a Ninth Circuit decision that upheld a town sign code
that categorized types of signs into three categories: ideological signs,
political signs, and temporary directional signs relating to a qualifying
event.
In practice, the code prevented a church from posting temporary
advertising signs. 12 The Court held that statutes must pass a prima facie
examination for content-neutrality 1 2 9 Further, the Court held that if a

statute fails this test, it is automatically subjected to strict scrutiny. 130 In
doing so, the Court rejected the reasoning traditionally relied upon by
118 See cases cited supra note 117 (detailing cases applying a practical analysis to content
neutrality).
119 See cases cited supra note 117 (giving cases where statutes were more likely to be found
content neutral).
120 See cases cited supra note 117 (analyzing cases under intermediate scrutiny).
121 See cases cited supra note 117 (showing governments were more often successful).
122 See cases cited supra note 117 (upholding statutes under intermediate scrutiny).
123 See cases cited supra note 117 (recognizing safety and aesthetics as important
government interests).
124 See cases cited supra note 117 (demonstrating that private parties were unsuccessful
under this analysis).
125 135 S. Ct. 2218 (2015).
126 See id. at 2232 (referring specifically to theory it adopted as "absolutist").
127 See id. at 2224-25 (describing categories in side code).
128 See id. at 2225-26 (recounting facts and procedural history).
129 See id. at 2228 ("But this analysis skips the crucial first step in the content-neutrality
analysis: determining whether the law is content neutral on its face.").
130 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. ("A law that is content based on its face is subject to strict scrutiny
regardless of the government's benign motive, content-neutral justification, or lack of animus
toward the ideas contained in the regulated speech." (citation omitted)).
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practical circuits.131
The Court examined and rejected the three arguments of the Ninth
Circuit-which was indicative of all practical circuits' reasoning-point by
point. 11 2 First, the Ninth Circuit contended "that the Sign Code was content
neutral because the Town 'did not adopt its regulation of speech [based on]
disagree[ment] with the message conveyed,' and its justifications for
regulating temporary directional signs were 'unrelated to the content of the
sign.""" The Court disagreed with this reasoning, stating that the first step
of any content analysis was to make determination of neutrality-the
statute needed to be neutral on its face. 134 Second, the Ninth Circuit argued
that the sign code was content neutral because it did not "mention any idea
of viewpoint, let alone single one out for differential treatment., 13 5 Once
again the Court was unpersuaded, stating that the Ninth Circuit had
"conflate[d] two distinct but related limitations that the First Amendment
While viewpoint
places on government regulation of speech. ,136
discrimination was a serious issue, it did not mean treating certain kinds of
speech differently did not prevent that kind of speech. 137 Third, the Ninth
Circuit claimed that the distinctions in the sign code based on "the contentneutral elements of who is speaking through the sign and whether and
139
138
The Court also dismissed this reasoning.
when an event is occurring.,
The legal error was the assumption that distinctions based on the speaker
did not "automatically render the distinction content neutral., 140 The
factual error was in the assumption that the occurrence of an 14event
meant
1
that the government was not looking at the content of the sign.
After determining that the sign code was content-based, the Court

131 See id. at 2227-30 (recounting and rejecting Court of Appeal's logic).
132 See id. at 2227-30 (discussing procedural history).
133 Id. at 2227-28 (quoting Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 707 F.3d 1057, 1071-72 (9th Cir.

2013)).

134 See id. at 2228 ("But this analysis skips the crucial first step in the content-neutrality

analysis: determining whether the law is content neutral on its face."). The Ninth Circuit
improperly looked at the motive behind the sign code, which does not weigh into content
analysis. Id. The reasoning relied on Ward v. Rock Against Racism, which concerns viewpoint
discrimination. See id. at 2228-29 (discussing precedent); see also Fee, supra note 52, at 1123
(discussing viewpoint discrimination).
135 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2229.
136 Id. at 2229-30.
137 See id. (overturning Ninth Circuit analysis).
138 Id. at 2230.
139 See id.at 2230 (stating reasoning was "mistaken on both factual and legal grounds.").
140 Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2230.
141 See id.at 2231 (reasoning against Ninth Circuit's "novel theory of an exception from the
content-neutrality requirement for event-based laws.").
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turned to whether the town's reasons were compelling and narrowly
tailored in a way that would survive strict scrutiny.14 2 The town had
presented safety and aesthetics as the justification for the sign code, which
the Court coined "hopelessly underinclusive., 143 The judgment was
reversed and remanded. 144
Although the decision was unanimous, three justices wrote
concurring opinions. 45
Justice Alito focused on providing local
governments with examples of how to author sign codes that would be
content neutral. 146 Justice Breyer and Justice Kagan each wrote separately
to express their concern1 47with the automatic strict scrutiny trigger included
in the majority opinion.
Justice Alito focused on how a sign code could still be effective
under the Court's guidelines. 148 He detailed several examples of how a
sign code could be content neutral, all of which fell into the broader
categories of time, place, and manner. 149 Justice Alito's opinion approved
of the automatic strict scrutiny trigger by indicating that the majority's
opinion was150not overly restrictive of how local governments could write
sign codes.
Justice Breyer's and Justice Kagan's concurring opinions voiced
concerns with the automatic strict scrutiny trigger put in place by the
majority opinion. 151 Justice Breyer stated that "the category 'content
discrimination' is better considered in many contexts, including here, as a
rule of thumb, rather than as an automatic 'strict scrutiny' trigger, leading

See id. at 2232 (finding that sign code failed strict scrutiny).
Id. at 2231.
144 See id.at 2233 (describing holding of the case).
145 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2233, 2234, 2236 (concurring opinions of Justices Alito, Breyer,
and Kagan respectively).
146 See id.at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring) (providing examples of regulations that would be
considered content-neutral). Justices Kennedy and Sotomayor joined in this concurrence. ld.
147 See id.at 2236 (Kagan, J., concurring) (expressing concern that a finding of content
based
automatically triggers strict scrutiny). Justices Breyer and Ginsburg joined in Justice Kagan's
concurring opinion. ld.
148 See id. at 2233-34 (Alito, J., concurring) (explaining how sign code could be
constitutional under decision).
149 See id. at 2233 (enumerating examples of content-neutral regulations). Justice Alito's
examples included "[r]ules distinguishing between lighted and unlighted signs .... on-premises
and off-premises signs, . . . [and] imposing time restrictions on signs advertising a one-time
event." Id.
150 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2233-34 ("Properly understood, today's decision will not prevent
cities from regulating signs in a way that fully protects public safety and serves legitimate esthetic
objectives.").
151 See id.at 2234, 2236 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., concurring respectively) (discussing concerns
with strict scrutiny approach).
142
143
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to almost certain legal condemnation., 152
The government must
necessarily regulate content-based speech from time to time, and
153
automatically subjecting it to strict scrutiny was not justifiable.
Accordingly, Justice Breyer would have only used content discrimination
as a strong weight in favor of unconstitutionality rather than an automatic
strict scrutiny trigger. 154
Justice Kagan questioned whether it was necessary to impose an
automatic strict scrutiny trigger. 155 Her argument was that the automatic
trigger undercuts the purpose of applying strict scrutiny to content-based
restrictions.1 56 The two purposes that were not served were (1) to maintain
an open marketplace of ideas; and (2) to ensure the government does not
favor one kind of speech over another. 157 Indeed, Justice Kagan points to
other previous cases involving facially content-based regulations, to which
the Supreme Court declined to apply strict scrutiny because there was no
indication of bias, or preference for one viewpoint. 15
She therefore

152 Id.at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring).
153 See id.at 2234-35 (Breyer, J., concurring) (stating "virtually all government activities
involve speech"). Justice Breyer provides several examples of federal statutes that regulate
speech based on content, such as securities, prescription drug labels, and income tax statements.
ld. at 2235.
154See id. at 2234-35 (Breyer, J., concurring) (noting strict scrutiny may make sense).
But content discrimination, while helping courts to identify unconstitutional
suppression of expression, cannot and should not always trigger strict scrutiny ....
The better approach is to generally treat content discrimination as a strong reason
weighing against the constitutionality of a rule where a traditional public forum, or
where viewpoint discrimination, is threatened, but elsewhere treat it as a rule of
thumb, finding it a helpful, but not determinative legal tool, in an appropriate case,
to determine the strength of a justification.
ld. at 2234-35 (emphasis in original).
155 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2237 (Kagan, J., concurring) ("Although the majority insists that
applying strict scrutiny to all such ordinances is 'essential' to protecting First Amendment
freedoms, I find it challenging to understand why that is so.") (citation omitted).
156See id. at 2237 (Kagan, J., concurring) ( "subject-matter exemptions included in many
sign ordinances do not implicate [First Amendment] concerns.").
157 See id.(describing underlying purpose of applying strict scrutiny when banning contentbased restrictions).
158 See id. at 2238-39 (reviewing previous Supreme Court case law on content-based
restrictions). See generally Davenport v. Washington Educ. Ass'n., 551 U.S. 177, 188 (2007)
(acknowledging "content-based regulations of speech are presumptively invalid."); City of Ladue
v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 46-47, 53 (1994) ( "[T]he exemptions from Ladue's ordinance
demonstrate that Ladue ...has not imposed a flat ban on signs because it has determined that at
least some of them are too vital to be banned."); Members of City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 814-15 (1984) ("Given our analysis of the legitimate interest served by
the ordinance, its viewpoint neutrality, and the availability of alternative channels of
communication, the ordinance is certainly constitutional as applied to appellees under this
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concluded that, in the present case, there was no need to "decide the levelof-scrutiny question 159
because the law's breadth made it unconstitutional
standard.,
any
under
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Reed is demonstrative of the
hardline stance against non-commercial speech restrictions. 160 Under this
absolutist framework, numerous challenges and appeals of previous sign
161
code disputes are likely to arise in the previously practical circuits.
Furthermore, questions arise over the prudence of an automatic strict
scrutiny trigger, which is a blunt instrument in a fluid and often changing
area of the law. 162 However, practitioners can still effectively advocate by
strategizing to get a favorable standard6 of review by focusing on certain
aspects of First Amendment precedent. 1
A. Litigation Strategies
Any litigation involving a crossroad between First Amendment
speech and the right of the government to regulate it will need a strong
argument either way for content analysis. 64 However, content analysis is
merely the first step, and the second is formulating an argument based on
which level of scrutiny is applied. 165 To litigate effectively, private
people
166
and entities will employ different strategies than governments.
B. Content Analysis and Level of Scrutiny
Whether a statute is content-based or content-neutral will be the
first, and arguably most important, point in these kinds of cases.167
Because of the holding in Reed, it is abundantly clear that statutes must

standard.").
159

Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring).

160 See id. at 2224 (majority opinion) (summarizing reasoning and holding).
161 See generally id. at 2236-39 (Kagan, J., concurring) (raising concerns over
automatic

strict scrutiny trigger).
162 See generally id. (Kagan, J., concurring) (raising concerns over automatic strict scrutiny
trigger).
163 See infra Part IV.A (giving guiding principles for litigation under absolutist framework).
164 See Chemerinsky, supra note 28, at 49 (noting content analysis as primary question).
165 See id. at 55 (describing content analysis as first step to determining level of scrutiny).
166 See infra Part IV.A.i (discussing content analysis and what level of scrutiny will apply).
167 See supra Part II.B (examining content analysis and First Amendment).
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survive a prima facie examination of content neutrality or be subjected to
strict scrutiny. 168 Therefore, practitioners should have detailed arguments
169
prepared for a prima facie case proving or disproving content neutrality.
Private individuals and corporations challenging sign codes or
similar ordinances will fare better under the current absolutist approach
when arguing for a content-based finding. 1 0 Because any enumerated
exceptions constitute looking at content-a common facet of statutes
involving signs-courts will apply strict scrutiny. 1 Any indication that a
sign code regulates anything other than time, place, or manner will trigger
strict scrutiny.1 72 For example, any law's treatment of speech that
distinguishes between speakers in any way renders a statute contentbased.1 3 Furthermore, private individuals can also challenge
whether a
1
statute leaves open alternative channels of communication. 74
Even in a case where a statute receives intermediate scrutiny,
government parties should still be prepared to argue that it promotes
important government interests. 1 7 5 Safety and aesthetics are the interests
traditionally relied upon.1 6 Practitioners should ensure that those
interests
1
apply, and if not, prepare to argue for other important interests. 77
Private parties in a content-neutral case will still have ample
opportunity to challenge the validity of a statute.1 8 In these cases, it may
be beneficial to argue that the statute is over-inclusive as far as preserving
the government interest (perhaps, state the government interest precisely
within this sentence).,1 9 A statute that is not narrowly tailored to protect a

168 See supra Part III.B (detailing Reed case).
169 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2227 (majority opinion) (affirming that content neutrality is
determined by facially examining statute).
170 See sources cited supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (exploring absolutist
approach in which private citizens fare better).
171 See sources cited supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text (exploring absolutist
approach in which private citizens fare better).
172 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 (stating first step of content analysis is determining whether
statute is content-based on its face).
173 See Fee, supra note 52, at 1129 (banning discrimination based on speaker).
174 See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989) (requiring alternative
methods of communication remain open).
175 See cases cited supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (stating important government
interests and giving requirements for intermediate scrutiny).
176 See cases cited supra note 3 and accompanying text (naming safety and aesthetics as
traditionally important government interests).
177 See Ward, 491 U.S at 800-01 (showing regulations as to sound are another important
government interest).
178 See cases cited supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (describing content-neutral
statutes and their requirements).
179 See Ward, 491 U.S. at 798 (reviewing narrowly tailored requirement).
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content-neutral government interest will fail under this analysis.180
Practitioners should also be aware that only specific categories of
speech will qualify for a lower level of scrutiny.181 Areas of speech that
common sense may indicate as low value will not be treated as such unless
there is a tradition of protecting that speech less. 18 2 Outside of these
narrow exceptions, this allows practitioners to treat most First Amendment
content discrimination cases as equal183without having to make value
judgments about the contents of speech.
C. The Effect of Reed
The holding in Reed affirmed the view of the absolutist circuit
courts. 184 Because the absolutist view was the minority view among the
circuits, many towns and courts must now adjust to the new rule. 185 In
addition, governments and courts must prepare to deal with an automatic
strict scrutiny trigger that may inhibit their interests and exercise of
186
common sense.
i. Sign Code Challenges and Appellate Review
Courts and legal practitioners should be prepared for arguments
surrounding the prima facie case concerning local signs codes.1 8 Because
of the automatic strict scrutiny trigger, a prima facie finding of contentbased discrimination will almost certainly not be fatal to a government's
case.1 88 Local governments in formerly practical circuits would be wise to
review their sign codes under this new lens of constitutionality in order to

180

See id. at 798-99 ("[A] regulation of the time, place, or manner of protected speech must

be narrowly tailored to serve the government's legitimate, content-neutral interests but that it
need not be the least restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so.").
181 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (specifying categories
that qualify as low value speech).
182 See supra Part II.C.iii (examining Roberts Court's reluctance to add new categories of
low value speech).
183 See sources cited supra notes 1, 99, 101 and accompanying text (discussing precedent
excluding new categories of low value speech).
184 See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S.Ct. 2218, 2232-33 (holding that absolutist
rule would
not limit town's ability to make sign codes).
185 See discussion supra notes 113, 117 (detailing courts on either side of circuit split).
186 See Reed, 135 S.Ct. at 2239 (Kagan, J., concurring) (noting in past Supreme
Court did
not decide level of scrutiny on lack of necessity).
187 See id.at 2228 (majority opinion) (emphasizing prima facie case).
188 See id.at 2236 (Breyer, J., concurring) (voicing concerns about automatic strict scrutiny
trigger).
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avoid litigation.18 9
Practitioners working on appeals for private citizens should look at
the counterarguments available to local governments that concern the time,
place, and manner of a sign.' 9° Any categorization that makes even the
barest reference to the content of a sign is impermissible. 91 A prima facie
case where categorizations are involved will likely sway easily to the

private citizen. 192
A government's best course of action in the current climate will
likely be preventative.1 93 To avoid court invalidation, legislators should
194
carefully word statutes to avoid creating categories and exceptions.
However, in ordinances that do include exceptions, courts will be unlikely
to find that they manage only the time, place, and manner of the speech,
making them content-based. 195 In these cases, government parties should
be prepared to face strict scrutiny. 196 Once a statute receives strict scrutiny,
it is nearly impossible to overcome. 197 Safety and aesthetics will not be
enough to meet the compelling government interest requirement. 198
However, in a statute regulating speech that does not have
exceptions, a government could make the argument for content
neutrality.1 99 In his concurrence in Reed, Justice Alito provided several

189 See id. (Kagan, J., concurring) (detailing types of restrictions in jeopardy under majority

decision).
190 See cases cited supra notes 45-49 and accompanying text (describing requirements of
content neutral statute).
191 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2228 (majority opinion) (allowing time, place, and manner
restrictions).
192 See id. (discussing application of content neutral cases).
193 See Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 514-15 (1981) (banning
governments from categorizing favorable and unfavorable speech). Following the guidelines
from the plurality in Metromedia, Inc. and other cases following its lead, legislators will be able
to avoid pitfalls in their statutory construction. See id. (explaining San Diego's next steps for
billboards displaying noncommercial messages).
194 See id. (explaining San Diego's next steps for billboards displaying noncommercial
messages); see also cases cited supra note 110 (giving cases where codes were found
unconstitutional).
195 See cases cited supra notes 42-44 (demonstrating likelihood of courts to apply strict
scrutiny).
196 See cases cited supra notes 42-44 (demonstrating likelihood of courts to apply strict
scrutiny).
197 See cases cited supra notes 42-44 (demonstrating likelihood of courts to apply strict
scrutiny was applied to First Amendment issues).
198 See Reed,135 S. Ct. at 2231-32 (rejecting sign code under strict scrutiny using safety and
aesthetics); Metromedia,Inc., 453 U.S. at 507-08 (stating that safety and aesthetics are substantial
governmental goals).
199 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2233 (Alito, J., concurring) (guiding governments to statutes that
will be considered content neutral).
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examples of regulations that would not be content-based. 200
This
concurrence serves as a guidebook for what kinds of regulations would
receive intermediate scrutiny. 2° ' Regulations must concern only the time,
place, or manner of a sign, and leave open alternative channels of
communication. 202
ii. Automatic Strict Scrutiny Trigger
The automatic strict scrutiny trigger lacks a common sense judicial
safety valve. 203 Many of the government's duties involve speech and the
regulation thereof. 204 Signs are required for health and safety, as well as
aesthetics.2

5

From local governments to Federal agencies, the state often

regulates speech on signs based on their content. 206 Judges now have no
mechanism to differentiate these kinds of speech from any other kind of
non-commercial speech.20
Strict scrutiny may be proper in most cases regarding content
discrimination. 20'

Applying it reaffirms the idea that the government may

not choose what speech is valuable based on its content, an idea well
protected by the First Amendment. 20 9

However, it is not without its

mechanism.2 0

drawbacks as a judicial
It adopts an un-nuanced viewpoint
about a nuanced topic. 211 Free speech is a complex and fluid ideal, and one

200

See id. (guiding governments to statutes that will be considered content neutral). Some of

these rules included regulating the size of signs, regulating the locations where signs are placed,
and distinguishing the placement of signs between commercial and residential property. ld.
201 See id. (explaining when intermediate scrutiny will apply).
202 See cases cited supra notes 45, 47-49 and accompanying text (outlining requirements for
content neutrality in statutes).
203 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2236-37 (Kagan, J., concurring) (detailing circumstances under
which courts will have to invalidate reasonable statutes).
204 See id. at 2234-35 (Breyer, J., concurring) (listing statutes that require content-based
regulation pertaining to governmental protections).
205 See id. (providing examples of government regulated speech "where a strong presumption
against constitutionality has no place").
206 See id. at 2235 (pointing out that both federal and state statutes regulate speech).
207 See id. at 2235-36 (pointing out that both federal and state statutes regulate speech).
208

See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring) (listing statutes that require content-

based regulation pertaining to governmental protections).
209 See id. at 2227 (majority opinion). The Court stated that "laws that cannot be 'justified
without reference to the content of regulated speech,' or that were adopted by the government
'because of disagreement with the message [the speech] conveys,"' and "[laws] that are content
based on their face, must also satisfy strict scrutiny."). Id. (internal citations omitted).
210 See id. at 2234-39 (Breyer & Kagan, JJ., concurring) (handing down concurring
opinions
focusing on automatic trigger).
211 See id. (asserting need for flexibility in content discrimination analysis).

342

JOURNAL OF TRIAL & APPELLATE ADVOCACY

[Vol. XXI

that rarely arises in a binary fashion.2 12 Videos depicting animal torture are
treated with the same reverence as the ability to speak out against the
government, all under the umbrella of the First Amendment. 213
Something less than an automatic strict scrutiny trigger in content
discrimination cases is supported by Supreme Court precedent.21 4 As
Justice Kagan detailed in her concurring opinion, it was not necessary to
reach the level-of-scrutiny question in Reed nor was it necessary to make
the strict scrutiny trigger automatic.2 5 Other cases have allowed courts to
examine what level of scrutiny was appropriate when bias was not an
issue.216 While the code in Reed needed to be examined under strict
217
scrutiny, the case did not call for a broad automatic strict scrutiny trigger.
V. CONCLUSION
First Amendment case law walks a fine line between the rights of
the individual and the need for the government to regulate. Should a rule
be too strict, it prevents the government from performing its necessary
functions. However, if a rule is too lenient, governments would be allowed
to infringe on the fundamental rights of the individual.
Although expressed in a unanimous decision, the holding in Reed
has generated certain reservations. Whether an automatic strict scrutiny
trigger was prudent will become clearer in time.
Additionally, the
implications that this laissez faire reading of the First Amendment will
have on other types of speech is yet to be seen. Following the current trend
in the Roberts Court, it seems unlikely that a restriction on speech without
historic roots will be upheld.
When navigating the framework of First Amendment analysis,
litigators must pay careful heed to many exceptions and distinctions.
Emerging as one of the most complex of these distinctions is the difference

212

See supra Part II.B (expounding on complex relationship between First Amendment and

content analysis).
213 See sources cited supra note 101 and accompanying text (discussing cases that narrow
definition of low value speech).
214 See Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2238-39 (Kagan, J., concurring) (positing alternative to automatic
strict scrutiny trigger).
215 ld. at 2239.
216 See id. at 2238-39 (detailing Supreme Court precedent regarding bias as a relevant factor).
217 See id. at 2239 ("The absence of any sensible basis for these other distinctions
dooms the
Town's ordinance under even the intermediate scrutiny that the Court typically applies to 'time,
place, or manner' speech regulations. Accordingly, there is no need to decide in this case whether
strict scrutiny applies to every sign ordinance in every town across this country containing a
subject-matter exemption.").
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between content-based and content-neutral regulations.
Clouded by
conflicted precedent and obscure language, the traps of content analysis are
treacherous even for the most experienced litigator. Litigators taking on
these cases must be prepared to formulate strategies based on whether they
will face strict or intermediate scrutiny. Being aware of the current
absolutist climate in the area of content discrimination is the first step to
successfully litigating these First Amendment cases.
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